The main reason for the renewed interest in the Arctic is that climate change is making the area more accessible, but to this comes that the renewed big power rivalry means that every issue, even the most improbable, is converted into military disputes. More especially regarding Greenland, there is a particular additional factor: Donald Trump’s vanity. He wishes to go into history as a President who seriously enlarged the US territory. But that is another story, and we shall leave that aside.
Firstly, Climate Change may open up for new economic possibilities related to the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic. The main contenders for the territory are Russia and Canada, as can be seen from the map below.
Russia and Canada are the most important coastal countries, followed far behind by the US (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland) and Norway. Image: Todd C. Atwood. The dotted red line indicates the 200 mile-zone for each country.
While Russia and Canada already have important projects in the Arctic exploiting oil, gas and mineral resources, the perspectives for similar projects in Greenland are more doubtful. Greenland has historically seen mining of coal (Qullissat on Disko Island, 1924-1972), cryolite (Ivittut, 1854-1987) and zinc, lead and silver (‘Black Angel’ Mine in Maarmorilik, near Uummanaq, 1973-1990). All the mines were closed due to either exhaustion or becoming uneconomical. No economically feasible oil or gas has been found in Greenland so far. After long investigations of the prospects for uranium mining in Kvanefjeld, close to Narsaq in South Greenland, the Government decided in 2021 not to proceed due to environmental concerns (which has led the Australian company ‘Energy Transition Minerals’ to sue the country for up to USD 11.5 billion). Taking into account that the main raw material projects are carried out within each country’s exclusive economic zone, and future projects probably will too, the struggle for access to resources can hardly justify the proposed militarisation. All the talk about the threat to the Arctic from Russia and China is therefore very difficult to substantiate.
Chinese container ships passing through the Eastern North Sea Route in 2023. Photo Rosatomflot.
Secondly, the shrinking ice mass around the North Pole is making navigation north of Canada and Russia easier. While I doubt that the sea route north of Canada can become a serious competitor to the Panama Canal, Russia is betting strongly on the sea route north of Russia, as it is a much shorter route between the Northern Pacific and Atlantic Oceans than through the Suez canal. For Russia, the project is strategic, as it is the only major international sea route not controlled by the US and its allies. To this come the oil, gas and mineral projects, existing and new ones under construction, among these the huge Vostok Oil Project, which will be shipped out via the Northeastern Sea Route. The use of the Northwestern Sea Route (Canada) for transit is negligible (18 ships in 2024), while the use of the Northeastern Sea Route (Russia) for transit is increasing. In 2025 there were 103 transit voyages moving an estimated 3.2 million tons of cargo (if transport of raw materials from the Russian mining projects is included the cargo is ten times bigger). Russia is aiming for 130 million tons of transit cargo traffic by 2035 (which does not look very realistic).
The US has been disputing the Russian and Canadian regulations of the Northern Sea Routes for years. Both Russia and Canada require that foreign commercial ships get a prior authorization for transit of the internal straits. This is based on the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which grants coastal states certain mechanisms to regulate shipping in ice-covered marine areas within their Economic Exclusive Zones for the purpose of environmental protection. The US claims that these straits constitute international sea lanes where there is freedom of navigation (which does not prevent it from blocking ships sailing to Venezuela and Cuba).
The other contentious issue is the passage of warships, as Russia also requires these to seek permission to enter its internal waters and the straits. The US therefore wants to conduct what they call ‘Freedom of Navigation Operations’ with their warships challenging the Russians. There is a snag, however, which is that the US has no warship with the ice-class needed to pass through the eastern part of the route, where the ice is particularly challenging. So presently this is a storm in a teapot and can hardly be used as an argument for militarisation of the Arctic.
Arc7 ice classification patrol ship Ivan Papanin in the Kola Bay. Photo: Northern Fleet press service.
Thirdly there is the NATO concept the ‘Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap’ (called the ‘GIUK gap’). This was a cold war strategy to bar the access of the Russian civilian and military fleets to the Atlantic. As the name says, Greenland and Iceland were strategic points in NATO’s war plans. This concept has now been dusted off and is used as an argument for the militarisation of the North Atlantic. It is not a defensive military strategy, it is an offensive one aimed at strangulating the Russian economy and its naval power in case of war. Russia has by its geographic position limited access to the Atlantic Ocean. It depends on the Danish straits to get out from the Baltic Sea and on the Turkish Bosporus strait to get out from the Black Sea. During World War II, the Arctic was strategic for Russia (then USSR) as it was the only international sea-lane open for it to access the Atlantic. The GIUK intends to close that access.
Map of the so-called Greenland Iceland UK “Gap”. Image from wikimedia.
There has of course been military installations in the Arctic for many decades, both in Russia, Canada and Greenland. In Greenland, the main military installation is the US ‘Thule Base’, in 2003 renamed ‘Pituffik Space Base’ to reflect the name in Inuktun. (The name ‘Thule’ was invented by Danish Polar Explorers Knud Rasmussen and Peter Freuchen, when they set up a trade post there in 1910, after a poem by Goethe ‘Der König in Thule’). The horrible nuclear accident there in 1968 stresses the risks related to the nuclearisation of the Arctic.
An American B-52 aircraft crashed in 1968 near the Thule Base in Northern Greenland with 4 nuclear bombs on board. One of the bombs was destroyed during the crash and radioactive plutonium was scattered across a large area. Despite a clean-up, some of it still lies on the bottom of the sea. The photo (from wikipedia) shows four similar nuclear bombs ready to be loaded on a B-52.
The Arctic has up to now been relatively free of superpower competition. The Russian building-up of infrastructure is presently limited to its own territorial waters and mainly aimed at supporting and protecting the Northeastern Sea Route from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There are unresolved territorial disputes regarding the North pole area outside the 200-mile exclusive zones, but this is presently only a theoretical issue as the ice-cover still makes extractive activities at the bottom of the ocean very difficult. Apart from that, there are no serious territorial disputes. Norway and Russia have a long history of cooperation in the Barents Sea, particularly related to fishing quotas (the agreement was renewed in December 2025). There has been good cooperation in the Arctic Council up to the start of the Ukraine war, but Russia, the biggest Arctic nation, has since in practice been excluded. Russia has stopped its financial contribution and has threatened with complete withdrawal, but that has no happened yet. An Arctic Council without Russia doesn’t make much sense, but even so, that is what some Norwegian politicians are planning.
President Trump’s second administration wants to ensure American Arctic dominance, sparking debates over the risks of militarization and the wisdom of abandoning restraint. This militarisation of the Arctic has no rational justification. Unless you consider the desire of the US to exert World Dominance also here as rational. It is nobody’s interests, not even the Americans’. Even so, the EU (and Denmark and Norway) are playing along with the Trump’s aggressive policy. Believe it or not!
