The recent Ukrainian incursion in the Russian Kursk province appears as a propaganda scoop. The incursion took Russia by surprise, it humiliated the Russian intelligence services, which failed to discover Ukraine’s building up of forces in the bordering Sumy Province, and they succeeded in penetrating almost 30 kilometres into Russia. So it looks as a real success, right? Yes, if he was going for the media effect. But as a war strategy?

The incursion into Kursk has left many analysts scratching their heads as they try to understand what Zelensky is trying to achieve (except for the short-lived media effect). The reason is that the Ukrainian army is slowly but steadily being pushed back, particularly in the Donetsk province, and it has lost most of its heavily fortified defences constructed there since 2014 (Soledar, Avdiivka, Maryinka etc.) and is just now in the process of being squeezed out of its Toretsk (Dzerzhinsk) stronghold. The Russian army is now approaching the City of Prokovsk (Krasnoarmeysk), where defences are hastily being constructed, and the Ukrainian army is under pressure almost everywhere on the front-line. To make things worse, the Russians opened in May a new front just north of Ukraine’s second city, Kharkov, forcing the Ukrainian army to move reserves there. It succeeded in stopping the Russian offensive, but at the same time it weakened the defences in other parts of the front. Probably what the Russians wanted. And now Zelensky decided to stretch the front further by the incursion into Kursk. Unsurprisingly, the retreat of the Ukrainian army in Donetsk has since accelerated. Why would he do that? He makes you wonder whether he is on the payroll of the Russians?

The photo shows the coal mining town Toretsk (Dzherzhinsk) in Donetsk Province with its waste heaps. It has been converted into a heavily fortified area by the Ukrainian Army since 2014. The Russian army is now advancing in the town from the East and the South.

Zelensky and his spokespersons have changed their discourse several times, so that is not very helpful in understanding their motives. Several explanations have been proposed:

• The occupation of land in Kursk could make the Russians understand how powerful Ukraine still is and force them to the negotiation table, where Ukraine would have something to negotiate with. This is absolutely improbable. The contrary is much more probable. This leads to another theory, which is that this is exactly what Zelensky wanted: to avoid being forced to negotiate.

• The offensive could force the Russian army to move troops from the other parts of the front. This makes more sense, but it has apparently not happened as the Russians have preferred to send troops from other parts of the country. It seems that they are in no hurry to force the Ukrainians out and prefer to slowly grind them down as they have done in other parts of the front. And in the meantime continue the offensive in Western Donetsk.

• The Kursk incursion could boost the morale of the Ukrainian population and make them believe that the war can be won. This is no doubt true. However, if at the same time the Ukrainian army is retreating everywhere else, this will be a short pleasure. Furthermore, everything indicates that the Ukrainian losses are horrible, both in soldiers killed and in military equipment lost. At the same time the offensive has lost momentum, and they seem now to be stuck where they are, under heavy Russian bombardments. And continued losses.

• Zelensky wanted to show his sponsors in NATO that they are not a spent force. That they can still achieve something on the battle field. This is possible. But apart from his unconditional and disingenious fans like Boris Johnson and Mette Frederiksen, most of his usual sponsors have been surprisingly quiet. I guess they don’t want to get embarrassed if the whole thing goes completely wrong. Which it may very well do.

• More weird explanations have also been proposed. It is said that Zelensky hoped that they would be able to reach the Russian Nuclear Power Plant in Kursk and seize it. Then they could exchange it for the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, occupied by the Russians. It is a 90 kilometres trip to Kursk from the border! If that really is what they planned then they are very bold – but clever?

The German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 came as a surprise for the allied and was initially very successful. But it didn’t change the outcome of the war. The photo shows American Soldiers taken prisoners by the Germans.

The Ukrainian Kursk incursion smacks of desperation. Historic analogues are always tricky, but the first thing that came to my mind was Nazi-Germany’s powerful counteroffensive against the allied forces in the Ardennes in December 1944, at a point of time when the war was obviously lost. The Germans committed around 400,000 soldiers, 1400 tanks, 1000 air crafts and a lot of other military equipment. It took the allied forces (mainly British and American) completely by surprise and was initially successful, inflicting heavy losses on the allied forces. But the Germans were driven back around a month and a half later. This was the last desperate intent by Nazi-Germany to change the course of the war. They hoped that the offensive would force the Western allies to negotiate, and at least some Nazi leaders hoped that they would be able to convince Britain and the US to make common cause with them against the Soviet Union. But it didn’t work out. The Soviet Union instead heeded Churchill’s pledge to bring forward a planned powerful attack on the Eastern Front (the Vistula–Oder Offensive) to alleviate the German pressure.

Of course the Ukrainian offensive is much smaller, involving probably around 15- 20,000 troops. What the Ukrainian have seized in Kursk is a sparsely populated rural area, and the main town, Sudzha, had around 6,000 inhabitants (before people fled it). What is the future for the Ukrainian army in Kursk? Do they plan (and do they have the capacity) to continue offensive operations to expand the area, or will they dig in and try to keep what they have seized? Or will they say mission accomplished and pull out? Even if it makes no sense, my guess is that they will dig in, because pulling out after heavy losses would be difficult to explain to his people.

I must admit that I am also confused as to the motives for the Kursk adventure. I think the most probable is that it is first of all a media event, directed at lifting the spirits of the Ukrainian public and its NATO sponsors. This fits well into the pattern of other seemingly weird initiatives by the Zelensky and the Ukrainian army.

The photo shows a Ukrainian soldier in the village of Krynky, trying to create a bridgehead on the left bank of Dniepr. The adventure turned out to be costly in killed soldiers and lost equipment – and futile. But many nice photo ops.

For example the intent to create a bridgehead on the left bank of Dniepr (in Krynky village) where during almost a year soldiers were sent on suicide missions across the river by speedboats. More than 1000 soldiers were killed, some before even reaching the shore and others after spending a horrible time in mud-holes in the ruins of Krynky. Until the whole meaningless thing finally was called off. In war costly bridgeheads are sometimes necessary as part of an offensive (think D-day in Normandy). But there was no offensive coming. It was just a show-off. The strange thing is that it somehow worked as some disingenous analysts in NATO countries (among them a Danish one) started to talk about Krynky as a turning point in the war. A quick glance at the map could tell you that this could not be the case. Another example is the obsession of going to the shores of Crimea with speedboats and take selfies with a Ukrainian flag. Most of the time with heavy losses. Or the reluctance to abandon doomed positions, taking heavy losses before the inevitable retreat or surrender (as in Mariupol, Lysichansk, Severodonetsk or Bahkmut).

Photo from Maidan Square, Kiev. Relatives of soldiers, who were sent to Krynki, ask the authorities for their whereabouts.

PR and advertising are forceful tools. A clever advertising campaign for a decent product can do miracles making people believe it is something special. But even the best advertising campaign cannot make a bad product a success. It is the same in war. Having talented PR people, a big propaganda budget and the backing of supportive Western media are forceful tools. But they cannot convert defeats into victories.

And when the PR campaign is a substitute for a clever military strategy then you are in deep trouble.

Before the Ukrainian counteroffensive in summer 2023, Ukraine released a propaganda video probably intended to lift the spirits of the population and scare the Russians. The video was lauded in Western media. But the offensive was a complete fiasco. So the Ukrainian Government won the media war, but lost the real one.

To me Zelensky’s strategy (if he has one) looks suicidal. As far as I can see, he pins his hope on an escalation of the conflict, which will convince his NATO partners to come to his rescue. This is the only explanation I can find for the repeated shelling of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, and now sending drones against the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. And it may be the real explanation for the Kursk incursion: provoke the Russians to retaliate for example by bombing Kiev and in that way provoke a NATO intervention.

Why this suicidal strategy? Perhaps Zelensky is probably aware that as the war is unfolding, his survival is uncertain, both politically and physically. Not that the Russians will kill him; they probably won’t (despite what he is claiming). But if he decides to negotiate peace, his nationalist extremist friends may do so. And if he doesn’t negotiate, at some moment people in his surroundings may decide to get rid of him to avoid a complete defeat. So he has no easy way out. Poor guy.